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ABSTRACT 
According to naturalized metaphysics, metaphysics should be informed by our current best science and not 
rely on a priori reasoning. Consequently, naturalized metaphysics tends to dismiss metaphysicians’ attempts 
to quarrel with science. This paper argues that naturalized metaphysics should instead welcome such 
conflicts between metaphysics and science. Naturalized metaphysics is not (and should not be) eliminative 
of metaphysics. So, if such conflicts are driven by the immediate absence in science of an answer to a 
metaphysical question, then the conflict should not be dismissed, but instead be received as an occasion to 
do (more) naturalized metaphysics.  
That conflicts between metaphysics and science might be beneficial for naturalized metaphysics is 
exemplified by the case of non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. These theories are criticized by 
metaphysicians who, often following David Lewis, argue that spatial distance is an indispensable 
fundamental element in any coherent metaphysics due to its role as the world-making relation. The resulting 
conflict, however, is found to be well-motivated since the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity offer no 
alternative world-making relation to spatial distance. Rather than dismissing this conflict, naturalized 
metaphysics should therefore receive the Lewisians’ resistance as a call to search for one. How this plays out 
as a negotiation between the scientific theory and the metaphysical question is exemplified in the last part 






While there is no univocal definition of metaphysics, it is often characterized as the “systematic study of the 
most fundamental structure of reality” (Lowe 1998, 2), as “the study of ultimate reality” (van Inwagen 2015, 
1), or as “the exploration of the most general features of the world” (Blackburn 2002, 61, emphasis in 
original).1 This characterization, however, might just as well be given of fundamental physics, at least 
adopting a realist voice. Fundamental physics is arguably also interested in the structure and features of 
ultimate reality. It is therefore not surprising that this (apparent) overlap in subject matter between 
metaphysics and fundamental physics is a seed of conflict. This paper investigates such conflicts and more 
generally conflicts between metaphysics and science. The paper argues that, rather than being dismissed as 
signs of metaphysicians’ overconfidence, conflicts between metaphysics and science should be welcomed as 
hints of genuine and important questions to be answered by naturalized metaphysics. While metaphysics 
should ultimately defer to science, as naturalized metaphysics argues, metaphysicians should only yield 
when science – through naturalized metaphysics – provides a positive (metaphysical) answer in their 
metaphysical questions. 
As a case study, the paper uses theories of quantum gravity – theories that attempt to reconcile quantum 
mechanics and general relativity – where space appears to be absent at the fundamental level of reality as 
described by those theories. Space, distance, and generally extension do not seem to feature in the 
fundamental ontology implied by quantum gravity theories such as loop quantum gravity and causal set 
theory (Huggett and Wüthrich 2013). Consequently, such theories are received with suspicion by some 
metaphysicians and philosophers of science who have questioned the coherence of non-spatial ontologies 
(e.g. Maudlin 2007a; Hagar and Hemmo 2013; Lam and Esfeld 2013; Esfeld 2019). Presently, the focus will be 
metaphysical concerns about the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity that variously echo David Lewis’ 
(1986a; 1986b; 1994) thesis that spatial distance is the fundamental relation in the world and in particular, 
the relation in virtue of which the elements of an ontology make up a world.2 The disappearance of space in 
some theories of quantum gravity thus gives rise to a conflict between these scientific theories and Lewisian 
 
1 Such characterizations of metaphysics are disputed by others (e.g. Paul 2012; Bennett 2016) who argue that the 
questions addressed by metaphysics are different from those of science in general and physics in particular. This debate 
will be set aside here, though, since the focus will be on instances where metaphysics – as least as the term in used 
here – does come into direct conflict with science as exemplified by the conflict between Lewisian metaphysics and 
quantum gravity. Perhaps this shows that ‘metaphysics’ is misused in the present account, but anyone favoring this 
view can replace ‘metaphysics’ in the following by a more adequate term that they find better captures the sort of 
questions for instance Lewis asks about world-making.  




metaphysics (Wüthrich 2019): Where the Lewisians3 argue that spatial distance – given its role as the world-
making relation – is a necessary fundamental element in any coherent metaphysics, these theories of 
quantum gravity propose that in the actual world space is non-fundamental. 
Naturalized metaphysics is known to vigorously criticize metaphysics that is not sufficiently informed by the 
discoveries of our best sciences. It is therefore not surprising that naturalized metaphysics finds it misguided 
when metaphysics quarrels with science: “If there is a contradiction between the physics and the 
metaphysics, then the metaphysics must give way” (Bird 2007, 7).4 This sentiment is even shared by 
metaphysicians who are not usually cast as naturalists. Jonathan Lowe, for instance, gives metaphysicians 
the advice of “opening oneself up to the possibility that one's claims about the metaphysical features of 
actuality will be undermined by developments in empirical scientific theory” (Lowe 1998, 26). Even outside 
of naturalized metaphysics, few are inclined to follow Parmenides who, on a priori grounds, famously argued 
against the existence of change despite the empirical evidence to the contrary. The received view, in other 
words, seems to be that science takes priority over metaphysical theorizing in cases of direct conflict. 
This promises to quickly resolve the conflict between Lewisians and the non-spatial theories of quantum 
gravity: Considering that their resistance – like Parmenides’ – appears to be at least partly based on a priori 
reasoning, the Lewisians should simply yield and give up the fundamentality of spatial distance.5 For 
naturalized metaphysics, this conflict is another illustration that science-independent metaphysics is not only 
futile but also harmful, if it aims to compete with science (e.g. Bryant 2020).6 This paper, however, proposes 
that naturalized metaphysics might benefit from preserving such conflicts, at least for a while. As Humphreys 
(2013) observes, “[c]ontemporary science has revealed a much more subtle and interesting world than the 
often simple worlds of speculative ontologists” (p. 75). Science is sometimes in conflict with metaphysics as a 
whole in the sense that it proves that none of our hitherto conceived metaphysical frameworks are viable. 
However, what new metaphysics that science replaces these with will only be revealed if we remember to 
 
3 We shall use ‘Lewisians’ as a collective term for those who express a preference for the fundamentality of spatial 
distance. While the proponents of this thesis do not in general endorse all aspects of Lewis’ metaphysics, we shall use 
this term since especially Lewis’ Humean supervenience thesis is routinely referred to in support of the ontological 
prioritizing of spatial distance (e.g. Lam 2016; Esfeld and Deckert 2017).  
4 Obviously, this ruling relies on an appropriate demarcation between physics (and science in general) and wild 
speculation that may happen to involve some mathematical formalism; some might worry that some theories of 
quantum gravity are examples of the latter (see for instance Hedrich (2007) for a discussion of this and similar 
questions in relation to string theory). This issue will be set aside here for the reason discussed further in footnote 17 
that the present apology for conflicts between metaphysics and science does not rely on the assumption that the 
scientific theories in question are speculative or yet to receive proper empirical confirmation. 
5 Such a priori motivated resistance against empirical science will be denoted ‘Parmenidean resistance’ due to the 
methodological analogy with Parmenides’ a priori arguments against the apparent experience of change. This despite 
the curious coincidence that loop quantum gravity – especially with the apparent disappearance of time (e.g. Isham 
1993; Anderson 2012) – has similarities in content with Parmenides’ metaphysics. 





probe the metaphysics of a scientific theory and not simply end our inquiry – as naturalized metaphysics 
sometimes seems to recommend – when science proves our held metaphysical beliefs wrong. The presence 
of conflicts between metaphysics and science, I argue, is often the most vivid manner in which the 
metaphysical surprises of science manifest themselves, and these conflicts are therefore our best sign of 
when and where to begin such inquiry. This does not entail a rejection of the verdict that science generally 
takes priority over metaphysics. However, the paper proposes the qualification that it might be helpful if 
metaphysics offers a bit of (adequately motivated) Parmenidean resistance. The conflicts that result will 
encourage engagement with the metaphysical issue behind the conflict and thus ensure that science – 
through a naturalized metaphysics – not only proves our old metaphysics wrong but also provides a new 
metaphysics in its stead. The Parmenidean resistance of metaphysicians might, in other words, prove an 
invaluable resource for naturalized metaphysics. Furthermore, the paper argues that in merely raising 
unanswered metaphysical questions, this type of Parmenidean resistance should be acceptable to 
naturalized metaphysic even assuming all its central tenets. 
To illustrate how conflicts between metaphysics and science can serve as generators for naturalized 
metaphysics, the paper explores the conflict between non-spatial theories of quantum gravity and Lewis-
inspired metaphysics. Lewisians argue that without space in their fundamental ontology, such theories lack a 
candidate world-making relation and they are, as a consequence, at risk of being metaphysically incoherent. 
Following the present proposal, this is an occasion to inquire into the metaphysical question behind the 
conflict: what, if anything, might replace space as the world-making relation in non-spatial theories of 
quantum gravity?7 Rather than ending with this methodological suggestion, the paper exemplifies it by 
reviewing the details of loop quantum gravity for which it is argued that entanglement might serve as the 
world-making relation in this non-spatial theory. In a few more words, entanglement between the nodes in 
the spin-network of loop quantum gravity is found to be crucial for the emergence of space in this theory. 
This is taken to indicate that entanglement might be the relation in virtue of which the elements of the spin-
network make up a world and thereby be the relation that glues together the fundamentally non-spatial 
worlds of loop quantum gravity; a proposal that should arguably qualify as a “subtle and interesting” 
alternative to the ontologies of distance, but which is nevertheless motivated by science as naturalized 
metaphysics requires. This account thereby concretely exemplifies how the methodological proposal of the 
paper can be implemented to contribute to naturalized metaphysics. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the case study: the conflict between Lewisians and non-
spatial theories of quantum gravity. Section 3 then discusses how philosophers who pursue such conflicts 
 
7 When asking this question with respects to quantum gravity, we might be seen as following Norton’s (2020) 
suggestion that “metaphysicians ought to utilize quantum theories of gravity […] as incubators for a future 




are typically derided in naturalized metaphysics but argues that they should not be if the conflict is driven by 
the absence of a viable metaphysical interpretation of the scientific theory. In such cases, conflicts can serve 
as a heuristic tool for naturalized metaphysics. Section 4 exemplifies how this plays out in the proposal that 
entanglement is the world-making relation in loop quantum gravity, thereby answering the question that 
motivated the Lewisians’ conflict with the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. Finally, a conclusion 
follows. 
2 A CONFLICT BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE 
The Humean supervenience thesis8 “says that in a world like ours, the fundamental relations are exactly the 
spatiotemporal relations” (Lewis 1994, 474).9 A fundamental relation is important for Lewis’ modal realism, 
since it explains why something belongs to one rather than to another of all the actually existing possible 
worlds. It explains, in other words, how two entities can be recognized as worldmates: “things are 
worldmates iff they are spatiotemporally related. A world is unified, then, by the spatiotemporal 
interrelation of its parts” (Lewis 1986a, 71). Thus, both the notion of world and the worldmate relation is, 
according to Lewis, grounded in spatiotemporal relations.  
The aim here is not Lewis exegesis, and the outset for the discussion is instead more recent proposals, 
inspired by Lewis, that emphasize the centrality of spatial distance and which are explicitly directed against 
the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. An example is the ontology of distanced matter points 
promoted by Esfeld and Deckert (2017). Here, they argue that spatial distance is the relation that makes the 
world; the “world-making relation” in the terminology of Esfeld (2019). In their view, the need for a world-
making relation can be maintained independently of modal realism. Irrespective of whether the other 
possible worlds exist, there is a plausible sense in which we – and the entities with which we surround 
ourselves – belong to the same world. We are worldmates, and as such, some relation must make this fact 
true: “given a plurality of objects, there has to be a certain type of relations in virtue of which these objects 
make up a world” (Esfeld and Deckert 2017, 3). The need for a world-making relation comes from the need 
of ontological glue, and this is required as soon as we commit to the existence of “a plurality of objects” in 
the actual world. The task of the world-making relation is to be the relation that connects the elements of 
the ontology into configurations and as such, it grounds whether we live in a multiverse of more detached 
 
8 The Humean supervenience thesis has more to it than the claimed fundamentality of distance relations, see for 
instance Weatherson (2015) for an introduction.  




parts or a single connected universe. Thus, ‘what makes it true that we are worldmates?’ suggests itself as a 
genuine metaphysical question independently of modal realism.10 
The quest for a theory of quantum gravity does not, however, begin with this question. Rather, quantum 
gravity research is driven by an aspiration for unification of our account of nature: “The problem of quantum 
gravity (QG) is to find a theory that describes the phenomena at the intersection of general relativity (GR) 
and quantum field theory (QFT)” (Crowther and Linnemann 2017, 2). This problem has generated several 
competing research programs, the most prominent being string theory, loop quantum gravity, causal set 
theory, and causal dynamical triangulation (see the contributions in Oriti (2009) for an overview of these 
programs with focus on space and time). In their attempt to reconcile general relativity and quantum 
mechanics, several of these appear to do away with space at the fundamental level description.11 Loop 
quantum gravity, which we shall use throughout for illustration, offers a fundamental description of the 
world in terms of an abstract graph structure consisting of nodes and links.12 Both the nodes and the links 
carry a spin representation (SU(2)) and together these define the kinematical Hilbert space of states. States 
of this Hilbert space are manifestly invariant under local gauge transformations of the spin representation, 
and this presentation of loop quantum gravity is therefore called a spin-network. Since spin-networks are 
discrete, they already differ from the smooth structure of space. Indeed, most spin-network states will not 
even admit an approximation as a smooth spacetime just like an equilibrium thermodynamic description is 
only available if the macroscopic behavior of a system is sufficiently robust with respect to the individual 
changes among the microscopic degrees of freedom. When space is said here to be non-fundamental in loop 
quantum gravity, this is meant to be analogous to the sense in which temperature is non-fundamental in 
statistical mechanics.13 
Even if space is absent at the fundamental level as described by non-spatial theories like loop quantum 
gravity, Esfeld (2019) insists that the question remains what makes it true that we are worldmates: “in this 
case, we need another world-making relation than the spatial or spatiotemporal one” (p. 4). The problem, as 
Esfeld (2020) formulates it elsewhere, is that “no one has hitherto worked out a proposal for another type of 
 
10 See Jaksland (2020) for further discussion of the need for a world-making relation in the absence of modal realism. 
11 In so far as these theories aim to recover general relativity and general relativity describes the dynamics of 
spacetime, the theories are naively committed to recovering spacetime as an emergent phenomenon. Whether this is 
sufficient to regard spacetime as real is debated (e.g. Lam and Wüthrich 2018; Le Bihan 2018; 2019; Baron 2020). We 
shall set this debate aside here and simply observe that space appears to be absent at the fundamental level of the 
ontology which is sufficient to generate the conflict with Lewisian metaphysics. 
12 This is one of several possible expositions of loop quantum gravity, see Rovelli (2008) and references therein for an 
overview. 
13 Since equilibrium thermodynamics requires that “all reasonable macroscopic observables have steady values” 
(Pitowsky 2006, 432), no macroscopic description applies to many of the kinematically admissible microstates. The 
same applies to generic spin-network states: special circumstances must obtain for it to admit an approximation where 
anything is recognizable as space. See Wüthrich (2017) for further details and discussion of the disappearance of space 




relations than distances that could […] be empirically adequate” (p. 1892). One might object to Esfeld that if 
space is absent at the fundamental level of description, then the same could be the case for worldmates. 
Indeed, people, tables, and chairs play no explicit role in for instance the fundamental description in terms of 
graph structures from loop quantum gravity. This, however, does not show that there are no worldmates 
and no need for a world-making relation. If two elements are worldmates at some level of description, then 
irrespective of what (complex) they correspond to at the fundamental level of description, they must 
arguably remain worldmates and some relation must make this fact true. Thus, just as one inquires how a 
non-spatial theory of quantum gravity accounts for space, one can inquire what at its fundamental level of 
description makes it true that we are worldmates. As discussed in further detail in section 4, we should be 
open to the possibility that these theories prove ‘worldmate’ to be an inadequate category with the 
consequence that no question about world-making arises, but the reason would be more subtle than the 
absence at the fundamental level of the entities usually supposed to be worldmates. Rather, the question 
might be obsolete if it turns out that the categorization in terms of elements and relations is problematic. 
Presently, the need for a world-making relation will largely be taken for granted for purposes of illustration 
and it is therefore left open that the physics might in the end render this metaphysical question to be ill-
posed rather than providing another world-making relation;14 though we shall argue that loop quantum 
gravity does seem to suggest entanglement as alternative world-making relation. 
Assuming the question about world-making is well-posed, if the distance relation is absent at the 
fundamental level of the ontology, then another relation must take its place, but according to Esfeld no such 
alternative is currently on offer.15 Consequently, Esfeld (2019) cautions against the apparent metaphysical 
import of these (seemingly) non-spatial theories of quantum gravity: “as things stand, it is reasonable to 
recommend caution about proposing far reaching ontological consequences such as the disappearance of 
spacetime or fundamental spatiotemporal relations” (p. 13). These worries about fundamentally non-spatial 
worlds are reasons to be skeptical of these scientific theories; especially of their alleged metaphysical 
implications. In other words, though Esfeld offers it in a conciliatory voice, metaphysical concerns are 
pivoted against scientific theorizing – here in the form of specific theories of quantum gravity with 
metaphysically worrisome implications. 
While Esfeld and the other authors mentioned in the introduction are those that voice their concern about 
the non-spatiality of certain theories of quantum gravity most explicitly, many of their worries are mirrored 
by those who prefer the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics out of a concern for the absence of 
 
14 Likewise, we shall not enter the debate whether some views on emergence, ontological reduction, and levels of 
reality might allow that entities at some level of description are world-mates while entities at another level of 
description – such as those of the supervenience base of the former – are not. 
15 With space being emergent (in some sense) in the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity, one might propose that 




local beables16 in other interpretations (e.g. Maudlin 2007a; Bricmont 2017); some of these even expressing 
an explicit sympathy for Humean supervenience (e.g. Loewer 1996; Miller 2014). Also, the primitive ontology 
program (also most often pursued in the context of quantum mechanics) explicitly requires that “any 
satisfactory fundamental physical theory […] contains a metaphysical hypothesis about what constitutes 
physical objects […] which lives in three-dimensional space or space-time and constitutes the building blocks 
of everything else” (Allori 2015, 107). According to (this type of) primitive ontology, space is a precondition 
for any satisfactory metaphysics and thus an essential component of the metaphysics of a satisfactory 
physical theory. Consequently, proponents of primitive ontology and more generally those favoring local 
beables will most likely share Esfeld’s sentiment that theories without space at the fundamental level of 
their ontology should be treated with caution, or perhaps even deem such theories metaphysically 
illegitimate. This, then, generates a tension with non-spatial theories of quantum gravity and offers a 
concrete example of a conflict between metaphysics and science.  
Before we proceed to the attitude towards such conflicts in naturalized metaphysics, one may wonder how 
this and other conflicts like it can be sustained for long enough to be the subject of a methodological 
discussion. Why are these conflicts not simply resolved instead? After all, the scientific theories in question 
are readily available in research papers, reviews, and even often textbooks. When Esfeld worries what is the 
world-making relation in non-spatial theories of quantum gravity, the question could just be met with a ‘like 
this’ – presenting the theories’ best account of the world. He can just have a look.17 
Science, however, rarely explicitly answers the questions of interest to metaphysicians. As also often argued 
in relation to the underdetermination of metaphysics by science (see for instance Andersen and Becker 
Arenhart (2016), French (2011), and Jones (1991)), the metaphysics of a scientific theory is rarely manifest in 
its formalism. Thus, having the theory readily available will usually not immediately answer the metaphysical 
inquiries one might direct at it, and this is for good reason: the questions driving the scientific theories are 
different from those driving the metaphysical exploration of them.18 Theories of quantum gravity and the 
metaphysical questions here directed at them make for a good example. As stated above, the construction 
 
16 In the sense of Bell (2001). 
17 As Esfeld (2019) notes, “the approaches to quantum gravity that allegedly entail that spacetime or spatiotemporal 
relations are not fundamental are approaches that, as things stand, do not yield any empirical predictions” (p. 11-12); 
they find themselves in a very speculative domain of high energy physics. This is a warranted note of caution about 
these theories, however, the apology made here for conflicts between metaphysics and science will not utilize this fact. 
Metaphysicians do not need this as an excuse when they ask metaphysical question of scientific theories. 
18 Esfeld (2019) relies on this underdetermination to question whether space is in fact absent at the fundamental level 
of these apparently non-spatial theories of quantum gravity alluding to the apparent non-locality in quantum 
mechanics which was reinstated in Bohmian mechanics (and thus proved to be at least consistent with the quantum 
formalism). However, the present argument does not rely on such underdetermination as part of its apology for 
conflicts between metaphysics and science, and it will therefore be assumed for purposes of argument that that 




of a theory of quantum gravity is driven by the problem of reconciling general relativity and quantum field 
theory; a problem that has proven difficult and that has therefore called for novel developments in 
theoretical physics. Non-spatial theories are among these developments, and their surprising character is a 
consequence of these difficulties. In other words, these theories were not developed to fulfill an aspiration 
to explore the possibility of a non-spatial physical theory. What these theories seek to make manifest is how 
they might recover general relativity and quantum field theory, and not what replaces distance as the world-
making relation. Theories of quantum gravity are designed to answer a particular question of physics; not 
various metaphysical inquiries. This explains why a conflict between metaphysics and science can persevere: 
Science rarely, if ever, answers metaphysical questions explicitly and this, as shall be argued in the next 
section, is why conflicts between metaphysics and science can prove useful. 
3 NATURALIZED METAPHYSICS AND METAPHYSICAL QUESTIONS 
Naturalized metaphysics features both a destructive and constructive component: The destructive 
component criticizes the traditional methods of metaphysics – intuitions, common sense, conceptual 
analysis, and a priori reasoning – while the constructive component proposes that metaphysics should 
instead be based on the findings of our current best sciences: “Naturalism requires that, since scientific 
institutions are the instruments by which we investigate objective reality, their outputs should motivate all 
claims about this reality, including metaphysical ones” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 30). 
Proponents of naturalized metaphysics argue that our intuitions, concepts, and patterns of a priori reasoning 
are the results of biological evolution, and according to Ladyman and Ross (2007) “there is no reason to 
imagine that our habitual intuitions and inferential responses are well designed for science or for 
metaphysics” (p. 3). These evolved cognitive features furnish no faculty that can provide insights about 
reality, and it is therefore problematic when they have traditionally formed the methodological basis for 
metaphysics. This is especially so, when metaphysics take interest in those parts of reality that we do not 
encounter in our lifeworld, for instance the content and structure of fundamental reality. Here, any reliance 
on these evolved features is “ignoring the fact that science, especially physics, has shown us that the 
universe is very strange to our inherited conception of what it is like” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 10); the 
sentiment also expressed by Humphreys (2013, 75) above. According to Ladyman and Ross, this criticism also 




necessity. In arguing what is metaphysically possible or necessary, the traditional methods of metaphysics 
have proven unreliable.19 Ladyman and Ross write: 
we deny that a priori inquiry can reveal what is metaphysically possible. Philosophers have 
often regarded as impossible states of affairs that science has come to entertain. For 
example, metaphysicians confidently pronounced that non‐Euclidean geometry is impossible 
as a model of physical space, that it is impossible that there not be deterministic causation, 
that non‐absolute time is impossible, and so on (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 16; see also 
Maudlin 2007b, 187–88). 
The traditional methods of metaphysics can neither be employed to say what is the case nor what can or 
cannot be the case. In particular, they cannot be employed to inform what features are indispensable for 
metaphysically coherent worlds.  
By this destructive component of naturalized metaphysics, there are no resources within metaphysics that 
can be mobilized for a quarrel with science. Indeed, Ladyman and Ross forcefully reject this type of 
speculation:  
Physicists do not believe there are such things as good a priori grounds for holding beliefs 
about the constitution of the physical world, and we suggest that only a foolhardy 
philosopher should be willing to quarrel with them on the basis of his or her hunches 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, 18).  
This includes “hunches” about possibility, and it should therefore be equally “foolhardy” to quarrel like this 
whether the science in question is empirically well-confirmed or not (though the former may be more 
preposterous than the latter). Even if a scientific theory is not actualized, nothing internal to metaphysics 
can justify the claim that a scientific theory describes an impossible state of affairs. This is also in good 
accordance with the constructive component of naturalized metaphysics that requires metaphysics to be 
motivated by the outputs of science; being in conflict with a scientific hypothesis – well-confirmed or not – 
looks to be the exact opposite. But how, one might ask, can we decide whether this theory is a scientific 
theory – such that this is a conflict between metaphysics and science – and not a piece of metaphysics itself 
whereby the conflict would be internal to metaphysics? Naturalized metaphysics has two independent 
replies: First, it can be argued that it makes no difference whether the theory being questioned by 
metaphysics is scientific or not. In both circumstances, there is no epistemically legitimate basis for the 
 
19 Since the aim here is an apology for conflicts between metaphysics and science within naturalized metaphysics, this 
alleged unreliability of the traditional methods of metaphysics on questions about possibility will be taken for granted 
here even though it, as for instance Morganti (2016, 87) argues, is questionable whether science has been any more 




conflict due to the problems with the traditional methods of metaphysics. Second, Ladyman and Ross (2007) 
identify science “using institutional factors as proxies rather than by directly epistemological criteria” (p. 37) 
such that “a ‘scientific hypothesis’ is understood as an hypothesis that is taken seriously by institutionally 
bona fide science” (p. 30). Institutional factors – including being published in respectable scientific journals 
and funded by scientific research fonds (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 36) – rather than empirical confirmation 
demarcate science from non-science. According to Ladyman and Ross, metaphysics cannot question the 
institutionally identified scientific hypotheses that include those of quantum mechanics and the relativity 
theories, but also arguably the main contenting theories of quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity, 
string theory, etc. From the perspective of naturalized metaphysics, proclaiming that worlds without space 
are impossible seems to be no different from the claim that non-Euclidean worlds are impossible, and one 
might therefore speculate whether the former, like the latter, is a mere example of metaphysicians’ 
overconfidence. 
This view has recently been advanced by Lam and Wüthrich (2020). Assuming that science should inform (or 
“guide”) metaphysics, they argue that  
from the point of view of the QG [quantum gravity] approaches pointing to the 
disappearance of spacetime […] assuming a priori an ontological framework for QG relying 
on some standard smooth spacetime background (e.g. assuming a priori an ontology of local 
beables for QG) is neither physically nor metaphysically legitimate (contrary to what is 
sometimes claimed in the literature, see Esfeld [(2019)]). Indeed, in this perspective, such a 
metaphysical assumption is illegitimate since it directly conflicts with certain physical 
ingredient principles on which the considered QG approaches are based (Lam and Wüthrich 
2020, 12). 
Since Esfeld and others, on Lam and Wüthrich’s construal, defend the need for space(time) at the 
fundamental level of the ontology on a priori grounds, it is illegitimate for them to hold onto this 
metaphysical assumption when the considered approaches to quantum gravity point to the non-
fundamentality of space(time). The scientific theory takes priority over metaphysical reasoning in cases of 
conflict. Insisting on an a priori metaphysical assumption in the interpretation of the scientific theory, i.e. 
“[p]ostulating ontologies on some fixed background spacetime for these QG approaches”, Lam and Wüthrich 
conclude, “stands in direct tension with the naturalism we have adopted and in particular with a naturalistic 
approach to metaphysics” (Lam and Wüthrich 2020, 13). In stressing their focus on specific “QG approaches” 
and in recognizing that these are still lacking in empirical support, Lam and Wüthrich are open to the 
possibility that the theory of quantum gravity that is eventually vindicated is one where space remains 




metaphysical objections to these non-spatial approaches. Lam and Wüthrich appeal to a naturalistic 
approach to metaphysics to argue that Esfeld and others must end their illegitimate metaphysically 
motivated criticism of the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity.20 
But exactly why is naturalized metaphysics critical of (a priori) metaphysical conflicts with science? The 
general aim of naturalized metaphysics is not, and should not be, to end metaphysics. Naturalized 
metaphysics involves a criticism of the methods but not the subject matter of traditional metaphysics. In 
contrast to eliminative programs advocating metaphysical anti-realism (e.g. Carnap 1950; Yablo 1998; 
Chalmers 2009), Ladyman (2017) insists that “metaphysics should not be abolished but reformed” (p. 143).21 
The constructive component of naturalized metaphysics involves the introduction of new science-informed 
approaches to metaphysics that can replace those illicit methods traditionally employed in metaphysics 
while preserving the subject matter and thus ambitions of metaphysics.22 Where metaphysical anti-realists 
are critical of metaphysical questions – for instance describing them as “devoid of cognitive content” 
(Carnap 1950, 28) – naturalized metaphysics is critical of how we go about answering metaphysical 
questions. For naturalized metaphysics, the questions themselves are not the problem. However, as 
Ladyman (2017) qualifies, “[t]hat is not to say that [naturalized metaphysicians] advocate answering all the 
same questions that are asked by analytic metaphysicians by different means” since some of them are 
“making insufficient contact with reality to be worth entertaining” (p. 143). Some – perhaps even many – 
metaphysical questions are (currently) epistemically unsafe to answer since the process of answering them 
will not be sufficiently inspired and constrained by science to satisfy the standards of naturalized 
metaphysics. However, it is still such epistemic concerns that are, or at least should be, behind the dismissive 
attitude towards metaphysicians quarrelling with science.  
This must also apply when Lewisians ask about the world-making relation, propose distance as an answer, 
and then caution against non-spatial theories of quantum gravity in the absence of an alternative to 
 
20 Notice that this does not entail that the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity considered by Lam and Wüthrich 
take priority over other theories of quantum gravity that are more hospitable to fundamental spatial relations (e.g. 
Goldstein and Teufel 2001; Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi 2018). Thus, while metaphysicians, on their view, should end 
their criticism of the non-spatial theories, metaphysicians are of course welcome to spend their time on the 
metaphysical implications of other theories of quantum gravity. Science, however, will decide which of these that will 
be vindicated and not some a priori argument to the effect that one or the other theory is metaphysically impossible 
according to naturalized metaphysics. 
21 The elimination of metaphysicians is not a characterizing feature of naturalized metaphysics either. Naturalized 
metaphysics does not recommend that metaphysicians should become scientists and adopt the methods of science in 
metaphysics; it is not characterized by this type of methodological naturalism despite some authors claim to the 
contrary (e.g. Esfeld 2018; Hudson 2016). 
22 Ney (2012), for instance, sees the task of naturalized metaphysics to be “to establish conclusions about ultimate 
reality” (p. 76) and Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that “no other sort of metaphysics counts as inquiry into the 
objective nature of the world” (p. 9). In this respect, naturalized metaphysics differs from other recent attempts to 
salvage metaphysics that instead adopt more modest ambitions on behalf of the content of metaphysics (e.g. Hofweber 




distance. Recognizing that the aim of naturalized metaphysics is metaphysics, the problem with this conflict 
is not the metaphysical question behind it: what is the world-making relation? Rather, the issue concerns the 
methods that are employed to promote the conflict, i.e. the intuitions and a priori reasoning – the 
metaphysicians’ “hunches” – that enter the argument to the effect that distance is indispensable. There is 
certainly some merit (at least from a naturalistic perspective) to the view that it is ill-advised to attach too 
much significance to our apparent inability to imagine a world without space; especially considering the poor 
track record of success for proclamations about metaphysical possibility.  
However, a priori arguments for the indispensability of distance are not the decisive elements in for instance 
Esfeld’s caution against the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity. As discussed in section 2, Esfeld’s 
caution is motivated by the absence of an alternative to distance as a world-making relation and he explicitly 
recognizes that the “[t]he claim that there are no fundamental spatiotemporal relations could be true” 
(Esfeld 2019, 2). This conflict is, in other words, not (only) the result of an a priori preference for distance as 
the world-making relation, as Lam and Wuthrich seem to suggest, but rather mostly driven by the apparent 
lack of any other answer to the metaphysical question. While the absence of space at the fundamental level 
in for instance loop quantum gravity entails that distance cannot be the world-making relation, it is not 
manifest in the usual presentation of the theory what other relation makes it true that the elements of the 
ontology are worldmates. Consequently, the Lewisians, in their conflict with these non-spatial theories of 
quantum gravity, are not simply stubborn, but rather they stand their ground since these theories only 
provide a negative answer to their metaphysical inquiry.  
In this respect, the conflict, and the Lewisians’ Parmenidean resistance, is different from conflicts where a 
metaphysical interpretation of the scientific theory is available but simply disliked by some metaphysicians. 
An (admittedly contentious) example for the latter is when relativity theory apparently sides with eternalism 
and the B-theory of time against the A-theory of time in the form of either presentism or the growing block 
universe. The potential conflict between presentists and relativity theory is of a different kind than that 
discussed presently and exemplified by the conflict between Lewisians and non-spatial theories of quantum 
gravity. With respect to the question of how to conceive of time, relativity theory has an apparently 
consistent metaphysical interpretation in eternalism, whereas non-spatial theories of quantum gravity have 
no such interpretation with respect to the question of world-making. We might say that science in cases like 
that of relativity theory is not actually in conflict with metaphysics, but rather in conflict with one side in a 
metaphysical debate. By the standards of naturalized metaphysics, metaphysicians quarreling with scientific 
theories because they dislike the metaphysical view favored by the theory should probably just yield (though 
this issue is of course much less clean once we recognize that the metaphysical implications might be 




In comparison, Lewisians’ resistance to non-spatial theories is not merely an expression of preference for 
space-based ontologies (though this might, of course, still have a place as Lam and Wüthrich claim). If a 
presentist were to give up her conviction in the sole existence of the present and only preserve her question 
about the nature of time, the conflict with relativity theory would immediately dissipate by the question 
being answered with eternalism.23 The same would not be the case for Lewisians. If not the conflict itself, 
then much of the tension between metaphysics and science would persist even if the contentious positive 
proposal that distance is the world-making relation were left behind. Moderate Lewisians – which might very 
well include Esfeld – could simply be cast as asking, ‘what makes it true that we are worldmates in non-
spatial theories of quantum gravity?’, but only receiving the answer ‘not spatial distance’. Since naturalized 
metaphysics does not in general renounce the meaningfulness or acceptability of metaphysical questions, 
Lewisians can certainly hope for an answer to their question and insist that we continue searching for one. 
To remain true to the spirit of naturalized metaphysics, however, this search should be sensitive to signals 
from the scientific theory that the question is not epistemically safe to answer or that it is posed in such a 
way that the scientific theory must be appropriated or “domesticated”, as Ladyman and Ross call it, to the 
metaphysical purposes of our question: 
An aspect of leaving science undomesticated is recognizing that it itself may tell us that 
there are questions we absolutely cannot answer because any attempted answer is as 
probable as any other. This does not imply that we should look to an institution other than 
science to answer such questions; we should in these cases forget about the questions 
(Ladyman and Ross 2007, 30). 
We should accept that some metaphysical questions are not answerable and as at least implicit from this 
remark, some metaphysical questions may in their very formulation presume metaphysical assumptions that 
could render the questions inapplicable to the considered scientific theory.  
Circumstances may, in other words, be such that a metaphysical question must ultimately be left 
unanswered, but pressing the question initially promises to be a good way of finding this out. As such, the 
Lewisians’ stubbornness enforces a tension – an echo of a conflict – which ensures that a positive answer to 
the question about world-making is pursued. Though the Lewisians might not be entitled in their preference 
for distance as the world-making relation due to its origin in the problematic traditional methods of 
metaphysics, their Parmenidean resistance ensures the reassertion of the metaphysical question: what 
 
23 Arguably, A-theorists might simply insist that relativity theory with eternalism does not provide a satisfactory answer 
to their metaphysical question and that there consequently is no alternative answer to that question. It is admittedly 
unclear who shall serve as arbiter in such cases. There is therefore a risk that allowing for conflicts between science and 
metaphysics as a whole will prove to sanction any conflict between metaphysics and science contrary to what is the 




replaces distance as the world-making relation in the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity? More 
generally, they are partaking in an overarching aspiration that scientific theories need a coherent 
metaphysical interpretation that goes beyond merely negative replies to metaphysical inquiries; an 
aspiration that should be acceptable to and shared by naturalized metaphysics as long as it keeps away from 
the contested methods of traditional metaphysics and is careful to avoid domestication of the scientific 
theories. Unless we allow for some Parmenidean resistance, we might overlook when scientific theories 
have disclosed hitherto inconceivable metaphysics.24 
Metaphysicians’ outspoken conflicts with scientific theories serve to remind us to seek positive answers to 
our metaphysical questions and not be content with negative ones. As such, conflicts between science and 
metaphysics as a whole (and not just one side of a metaphysical debate) are signals of when science leaves 
metaphysical questions unanswered. In so far as naturalized metaphysics aspires to answer metaphysical 
questions, conflicts between metaphysics and science should therefore be welcomed as occasions to do 
(more) naturalized metaphysics. This apology for conflicts between metaphysics and science does as such 
not offer any vindication for prioritizing the views of a priori metaphysics over those science (or science-
based metaphysics). But a priori metaphysics – through its conflicts with science – is nevertheless argued to 
be important and useful when naturalized metaphysics tries to develop a metaphysics informed by our best 
scientific theories. In this sense, the present proposal could be regarded as adding another function of a 
priori metaphysics to French and McKenzie’s (2012) toolbox-approach to metaphysics, where the methods 
and frameworks developed within traditional a priori metaphysics are appreciated for their usefulness as 
tools that the naturalized metaphysicians can employ for various purposes in their scientifically informed 
and constrained metaphysics (for further discussion, see French and McKenzie (2016), Ross (2016), Le Bihan 
and Barton (2018), and French (2018)).  
4 THE WORLD-MAKING RELATION IN QUANTUM GRAVITY 
The Lewisians can be cast as inquiring what replaces distance as the world-making relation in non-spatial 
theories of quantum gravity; a legitimate question – even by the standards of naturalized metaphysics – with 
no immediate answer. In general terms, Lewisians’ worry about the metaphysical coherence of a scientific 
theory and the resulting conflict – like other conflicts between metaphysics and science – can be received as 
 
24 Though presenting it somewhat differently, Norton (2020, 1966–71) offers four historical examples where science 
came into conflict with firmly held metaphysical beliefs and how these conflicts lead to what he describes as 
“conceptual revolutions”. In our terms, these conflicts, as documented by Norton, were used as heuristics for the 
development of new naturalized metaphysics. Norton (2020, 1971–80) also accounts how non-spatial theories of 
quantum gravity suggest a reconfiguration of the distinction between concrete and abstract objects which might be 
seen as yet another example where a conflict between metaphysics and quantum gravity drives important 




indicating a possible open problem relating to the metaphysical foundation the theory in question. This 
section will show in more detail – by the example of the conflict between Lewisians and non-spatial theories 
of quantum gravity – how such metaphysical worries can be utilized as a heuristic in naturalized 
metaphysics. More precisely, it shows how the Lewisians – and Esfeld in particular – with their Parmenidean 
resistance bring attention to the interesting metaphysical question: what replaces distance as that which 
connects the elements of the ontology in non-spatial theories of quantum gravity? Based (primarily) on 
reasoning coming from string theory, I have elsewhere given the details of how entanglement can serve as 
an alternative world-making relation (Jaksland 2020). The present account echoes this answer in terms of 
entanglement, but it does so based on loop quantum gravity which has been the primary example of a non-
spatial theory of quantum gravity in the debate between Esfeld (2019) and Lam and Wüthrich (2020). While 
this perspective from loop quantum gravity nicely supplements the other arguments in favor of 
entanglement as the world-making relation, the aim here is first and foremost to show how this work plays 
out as a naturalized metaphysics driven by the Lewisians’ conflict with non-spatial theories of quantum 
gravity such as loop quantum gravity. In particular, the present account will indicate how answering the 
Lewisians’ question about world-making – to abide by the standards of naturalized metaphysics – requires 
the negotiation between constraints coming from the scientific theory and the presuppositions that are 
implicit in this metaphysical question.  
For an ontology of objects in space, distance is an exemplary world-making relation: Every object is at a 
distance from any other object such that the distance relation can make it true that the two objects are 
worldmates. In addition, a coherent world-making relation should, according to Esfeld (2020), “(a) do the 
trick of individuating simple objects and (b) be empirically adequate” (p. 1892). This already exposes a 
dilemma for our investigation: how much and what aspects of the metaphysical question should be 
preserved? When asking a metaphysical question of a scientific theory, it is always a possibility that the 
question is explained away as misconstrued rather than answered. The scientific theory might simply expose 
that the question is asked on false premises or relies on inappropriate metaphors. In so far as the interesting 
new metaphysics is due to the answers, it is important that the metaphysical question is well posed. In the 
formulation of the question, Esfeld presupposes a metaphysics of individual objects; this is part of what the 
world-making relation should make sense of. While empirical adequacy seems to be a relevant minimal 
requirement, individuating simple objects – especially since Esfeld (2020, 1893) requires absolute 
discernibility25 – comes with the type of metaphysical prejudices that risk rendering our questions ill-posed. 
More generally, if we attempt to preserve too many of our metaphysical intuitions when answering the 
metaphysical question driving the conflict, then this might preclude the metaphysical novelties of the theory 
 




and in addition move us towards the domestication of science that naturalized metaphysics warns against. 
The ambition must not be to satisfy stubborn metaphysicians, but to use the conflicts between metaphysics 
and science as an occasion for open-minded exploration. 
It seems to me that there is never a guarantee that a metaphysical question is well-posed, since it can never 
be completely detached from any metaphysical background assumptions. Even asking for a world-making 
relation without any assumption about the nature of the relata relies on there being a relation in some 
recognizable sense. The result of the exploration of the non-spatial theories of quantum gravity might be 
that also this question is misguided. Still, this absence of relations would be a metaphysical discovery, 
especially if accompanied by indications of how to construe worlds without relations, and pursuit of the 
metaphysical question behind the conflict between metaphysics and science would have yielded interesting 
insights. I do, however, think that Esfeld and the Lewisians’ question about the world-making relation in 
quantum gravity can be answered, at least if it is stripped of its object ontology prejudices.  
The proposal of distance as the world-making relation provides us with two hints on what to look for. First, 
we are looking for a relation that relates every pair of elements of the world (though these may not be 
recognizable as objects in any strict sense). Second, distance is a likely world-making relation which suggests 
that whatever distance derives from in these non-spatial theories is a likely candidate as well. Following this 
second hint, we shall look at how space is supposed to26 emerge from the spin-networks of loop quantum 
gravity.27 As stated in section 2, the spin-networks are at the outset an abstract graph structure with a spin 
(SU(2)) representation for the nodes of the graph and one for the links. From this, one can construct a 
Hilbert space that defines the states of loop quantum gravity. The route towards space goes via Penrose’s 
(1971) spin-geometry theorem which implies that each node can be associated with a polyhedron; a 
geometrical object with polygonal faces that is uniquely described by the areas and angles between its faces. 
More precisely, one can for each link construct a scalar from spin operators. Each node is thus associated 
with as many such scalars as it has links and with the additional requirement of gauge invariance of the spin 
representation, these scalars of each node uniquely determine a polyhedron where the scalars are identified 
with the areas of the faces. The angles between the faces can, together with the areas, then be used to 
define a three-dimensional metric and the volume of the polyhedron. The angles, along with the other 
properties, are still quantum and thus associated with non-commuting operators: “the shape of a quantum 
polyhedron is fuzzy” (Bianchi 2017, 112). However, under additional coherence conditions (for details see 
Bianchi, Doná, and Speziale (2011)), the areas take precise values and the expectation value of the angle 
operators approximates the classical angles. The polyhedra thus become semi-classical and each node 
 
26 None of these approaches are yet rigorous and they can therefore not say with absolute certainty how space 
emerges. 




together with its links can in this way receive a geometric interpretation as a chunk of space whose volume 
and metric is determined by the spin-network: “the algebraic structure [of the spin representation] 
determines the existence of a metric at each node and therefore equips each quantum of space with a 
geometry” (Rovelli 2011, 4). Each node is linked to other nodes, and on the geometrical viewpoint this can 
be conceived as polyhedra adjacent to one another. In this way, a cellular space of many polyhedra can 
emerge from the spin-network. It is intriguing to imagine how this, despite its granularity, may approximate 
a smooth space, just like a regular dodecahedron – the Platonic solid consisting of twelve pentagons – may 
look round from afar. However, even from afar – and thus disregarding the granularity due to the polyhedra 
– the metric of this space is discontinuous. In the spin-network, any two linked nodes have a geometrical 
interpretation as two polyhedra facing each other. Since they share the same link, the faces have the same 
area, but since generic nodes have a different number of links to other nodes, the shape of and angle 
between the faces will be different even though they have the same area; they are not shape-matched. As a 
consequence, the metric is generally discontinuous (Bianchi, Doná, and Speziale 2011, 11).  
In a paper with Antonio Vassallo, Esfeld speculates how such networks of polyhedra or – “atoms of space” as 
they call them – might be connected up to form a continuous space. However, they also implicitly recognizes 
that spatial distance – or generally “metrical properties” – are absent at this fundamental level of networks 
of polyhedral: “grouping the atoms of space together in a suitable manner as represented by nodes and 
edges on a graph makes it possible for the configuration to instantiate metrical properties, while the 
individual atoms of space are connected only by a contiguity relation” (Vassallo and Esfeld 2014, 10).28 Thus, 
also Esfeld seems to agree that distance cannot be the world-making relation in loop quantum gravity. The 
referred to “contiguity relation” amounts to little else than noting that the polyhedra in the spin network 
representation are connected by links in the graph. And while this may be visually intriguing, it is just 
another way of representing the formalism. Proposing this contiguity relation as the world-making relation – 
which Vassallo and Esfeld do not do either – seems equivalent to simply stating the loop quantum gravity 
formalism as an answer.29 As already advertised, I think we can do better than that by considering how space 
emerges from the initially disconnected metric of contiguous polyhedra. 
Continuous (though still cellular) spaces, known as Regge geometries, correspond to special spin-network 
states where faces are shape-matched and aligned. Recent research suggests that entanglement between 
 
28 Vassallo and Esfeld’s ontology comprising of these atoms of space might be an interesting candidate for the elements 
in an ontology with entanglement as the world-making relation, but working out this proposal will be postponed to 
future work. 




the nodes of the spin-network plays an important role for this effect.30 One can understand the role of 
entanglement by remembering that we are dealing with quantum polyhedra: just like an electron can be in a 
superposition state of spin up and down, a quantum polyhedron can be in a superposition of various shapes. 
Two adjacent polyhedra, i.e. polyhedra sharing a link in the graph, both in such a superposition state might 
have the same spectrum of shapes, but upon collapsing the superposition they can collapse on different 
shapes: “their geometry has uncorrelated fluctuations. At the classical level this behavior corresponds to a 
twisted geometry—the geometry of a collection of polyhedra with uncorrelated shapes” (Baytaş, Bianchi, 
and Yokomizo 2018, 15). Considering electrons again, the collapse of the superposition state of two 
electrons can be correlated by entanglement, i.e. they are correlated if they are prepared in an inseparable 
state such as the Bell state. The same goes for spin-networks. Entangling neighboring nodes produce 
correlations between the polyhedra and therefore looks to be a necessary condition for the alignment and 
shape-matching of the faces. Baytaş, Bianchi, and Yokomizo (2018) conclude: “The results presented show 
clearly the role of entanglement in the gluing of quantum regions of space” (p. 16). It seems, in other words, 
that in loop quantum gravity entanglement is responsible for the emergence of the continuous cellular space 
that from afar will look like a (semi-)classical space.  
Entanglement appears to connect the “quantum regions of space” in the form of polyhedra. Even though 
these polyhedra or their related nodes bear little resemblance to objects as we know them, entanglement 
thus fills a role similar to that of distance in connecting the elements of the ontology. Entanglement is 
interesting in this regard, since it shares some of the features that made distance a likely world-making 
relation (Jaksland 2020).31 First, entanglement is an extrinsic property; something is entangled with 
something else. Second, entanglement shares the universality of distance: distance can relate everything in 
space to everything else and likewise, entanglement can obtain between any quantum degrees of freedom. 
Presuming that all degrees of freedom are quantum in quantum gravity, this entails that all degrees of 
freedom can be entangled in such theories. Furthermore, results coming out of algebraic relativistic 
quantum field theory indicate that all degrees of freedom not only can be but actually are entangled which 
testifies to the pervasiveness of entanglement. More precisely, Redhead (1995) shows that in the vacuum 
state all spacelike separated subsystems – all the subsystem that are also connected by a distance – are 
highly entangled and this result is generalized to generic states by Clifton and Halvorson (2001) who also 
show that no local operation can disentangle spacelike separated subsystems (see Lam (2013) and Swanson 
 
30 More precisely, it can be shown that the twistor geometry of generic spin-network states becomes a vector geometry  
(of which Regge geometries are a subset) by entangling the nodes of the network with their nearest neighbors (Baytaş, 
Bianchi, and Yokomizo 2018). 
31 Lewis specifically argues that if space is to be replaced, it must be replaced by a relation that is analogous (in a 
specified sense) to a spatiotemporal relation. A more detailed discussion of the extent to which entanglement satisfies 
Lewis’ condition for an analogous spatiotemporal relation will be postponed to future work. See, however, Wüthrich 




(2019) for further details). Third, entanglement is, via entanglement entropy and mutual information, 
quantifiable as a non-negative scalar just like distance. Given these features and its role in loop quantum 
gravity, entanglement is a promising replacement for distance as the world-making relation. Entanglement 
might be the relation in virtue of which the elements of the spin-network make up a world and that thereby 
is the relation that glues together the fundamentally non-spatial worlds of loop quantum gravity. While the 
non-spatial theories of quantum gravity had so far only provided the negative answer that distance is not the 
world-making relation, the Parmenidean resistance of Lewisians have driven the (preliminary) development 
of new metaphysics in the form of an entanglement fundamentalism hitherto unseen in the metaphysics 
literature.  
The proposal that entanglement might be the world-making relation in loop quantum gravity is claimed to 
qualify as naturalized metaphysics. It is a proposal that answers a metaphysical question but whose answer 
is motivated by a scientific theory. In being relative to loop quantum gravity, the proposal does not say 
anything of what is and certainly not what must be the case in actual reality. Following the deference to 
science in naturalized metaphysics, it is science that determinates what is and what is not the case. The 
claim is therefore that if loop quantum gravity is eventually vindicated, then entanglement might be the 
answer to the question ‘what makes it true that we are worldmates’. Again, following the spirit of 
naturalized metaphysics, ‘might’ is emphasized since the thesis should be considered fallible and 
furthermore, more research might reveal that this question about world-making is after all epistemically 
unsafe to answer in loop quantum gravity by the standards of naturalized metaphysics or that it may be 
prone to domestication.  
In connection with the latter, two warnings are in place: (1) Even though entanglement is offered as an 
answer to a metaphysical question, this answer originates in the serious engagement with a physical theory 
and for this reason, entanglement does not carry any significance beyond its role in gluing polyhedra in loop 
quantum gravity. Even though it is brought to bear on this metaphysical question, it does so as an element of 
the theory under scrutiny that is picked as a candidate answer to our metaphysical inquiry and its use in 
metaphysics must remain true to this origin to abide by the standard of naturalized metaphysics. (2) Esfeld 
might insist that entanglement is not a satisfactory world-making relation since it does not appear to 
individuate simple objects and it cannot provide for separable subsystems. Now, it may of course be that we 
have not found the right world-making relation in loop quantum gravity, but it seems more likely that the 
metaphysical question, and especially our expectation for the answer, must be adapted to what the theory 
provides. In this sense, answering metaphysical questions posed at scientific theories must take the form of 
a negotiation between our metaphysical aspirations and the details of the theory. The theory might 




explained away rather than answered. However, metaphysical lessons are learned under both circumstances 
whereby the conflict driving the investigation has proving useful to naturalized metaphysics. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The introduction claimed that few today would side with Parmenides and metaphysical doctrines against the 
senses and, by extension, science. This is probably for the best, but maybe a Parmenidean resistance of the 
right sort can still be beneficial. The history of science has been full of metaphysical surprises. Often, science 
has explicitly proven our metaphysical preconceptions wrong, quantum mechanics being an example. 
Science, however, is rarely similarly explicit about what metaphysical theory should take the place of our 
preconceptions; the industry of interpreting quantum mechanics nicely illustrates this difference. If we 
follow the tenet of naturalized metaphysics, metaphysicians should not start quarrelling with science over 
these lost preconceptions: metaphysics should yield to science. However, if we simply dismiss the 
metaphysicians like this, we lose one side of science’s contribution to metaphysics: whereas science will still 
prove our metaphysical preconceptions wrong, we risk continuing without putting any new metaphysics in 
their stead if we silence the metaphysical questions behind the conflicts between metaphysics and science. 
A Parmenidean resistance should be maintained until science has an alternative positive metaphysical story 
to tell. 
Such a resistance was specifically advised in circumstances where there is no known metaphysical 
framework that is consistent with the scientific theory. While some scientific theories simply side with one 
side of a metaphysical debate, other conflicts – such as that of Lewisians against non-spatial theories of 
quantum gravity – can be construed as a conflict between science and metaphysics as a whole. It is these 
conflicts that are valuable as indicators where science has only provided a negative answer and where there 
is consequently more work to do for naturalized metaphysics. Only by asking the metaphysical questions will 
we disclose the hitherto inconceivable metaphysics with which science replaces our metaphysical 
preconceptions. A bit of Parmenidean resistance ensures that we do so, and naturalized metaphysics should 
therefore welcome conflicts between metaphysics and science as a resource for metaphysical development. 
Section 4 showed how to carry this out in the context of loop quantum gravity – a non-spatial theory of 
quantum gravity – with an emphasis on what replaces distance in that theory as the world-making relation. 
The suggestion was entanglement; an answer arrived at as an equilibrium between the details of the 
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